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Abstract 
 
We explore the links between migration of labour and location 
specific (urban) pollution, suggesting a sense in which pollution can be 
welfare improving.  In a conventional Harris-Todaro model of urban-rural 
migration, individuals migrate so as to equate the expected urban wage 
(given a downward rigid real wage in the urban sector) to the real wage.  
Unemployment is endogenously determined.  Interpreting unemployment 
as damage, urban pollution (damage denoted in units of labour) can also 
support the same equilibrium with the value of damage equal to the value 
of resources otherwise lost through unemployment.  However, if the 
damage function implies an uninternalized externality (due to urban 
congestion, for instance), an internalization gain can be realized through 
the use of a Pigouvian tax (or instrument) that discourages migration.  
Thus if pollution is introduced into a Harris-Todaro model with no such 
features, environmental damage displaces unemployment to support a 
similar outcome.  Internalizing the externality then yields a welfare gain. 
We characterize the optimal Pigouvian tax in such a case and show that it 
is, in general, non-zero. In this sense, then, pollution can be welfare 
improving perhaps suggesting an alternative view of congestion and other 
adverse environmental effects facing urban dwellers in the developing 
world.  
  
JEL Classification: O1,O18,J6,Q21 
 
Keywords: Migration, Damage, Pollution, Unemployment
                                                 
* We acknowledge support from the MacArthur Foundation under a project grant on “A World 
Environmental Organization”, and thank Bingyong Zheng for comments. 
 1 
 
I. Introduction  
The idea that introducing or intensifying pollution can, in certain circumstances, 
increase welfare seems at first glance odd, if not strongly counter intuitive.  In this 
paper, however, we show how in a Harris-Todaro (1970) model of rural-urban 
migration, pollution that is concentrated in the urban area can serve to substitute for 
urban unemployment and can in certain circumstances be beneficial when the 
comparison is to a with unemployment equilibrium. Essentially, the argument is that 
if migrants take into account the money metric welfare equivalent of damage in their 
migration decisions, then introducing pollution in urban areas will tend to reduce 
urban unemployment.  We show that where damage is denominated in units of labor 
(such as travel time lost to congestion), for any given Harris-Todaro equilibrium with 
no damage there exists a damage level giving the same equilibrium allocation of labor 
in the urban and rural sectors, but with no unemployment. Damage merely substitutes 
for unemployment both in the migration decision and in the full employment 
condition in the labor markets.1  
 We then argue that, given this equivalence, we can formulate an explicit 
damage function generating the damage level needed for equivalence to the no 
pollution Harris-Todaro unemployment equilibrium. If we use an exponential damage 
function defined over the amount of labor in the urban sector (reflecting congestion 
costs), the power in the function gives the ratio between marginal and average 
damage. This represents an uninternalized externality, and welfare gains can be 
achieved relative to the market (uninternalized) equilibrium by using an 
internalization mechanism such as a Pigouvian migration tax.  For this to be the case 
                                                 
1 For a recent discussion of other alternative approaches to modelling the incentives for rural-urban 
migration in the Harris-Todaro model see Agesa (2000). 
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the downward rigid urban real wage in the Harris-Todaro formulation must be 
allowed to vary. 
 In this sense, then, pollution can serve to be welfare improving by first 
displacing resource wasteful activities such as unemployment, and secondly by 
creating opportunities for further gains through the internalization of external effects. 
While only a possibility, the thrust of the argument is that urban specific congestion 
and degradation, while distasteful to most people, nevertheless has the benefit in some 
developing countries of slowing urban migration driven by non-market interventions 
tilted in favor of urban employees as discussed by Harris and Todaro.   
 
II. The Models 
Consider a small open economy facing fixed world prices of the two goods it 
produces – an agricultural good (A) and a manufactured good (M). Amounts of the 
two goods are denoted by QA and QM respectively. The relative price of agricultural 
goods in terms of manufactured goods is p and is taken as being determined in world 
markets.   
The production function for the agricultural sector is: 
 ),( AAAA LTFQ =  (1) 
where TA is a fixed factor – land and LA is labor.  
Similarly, the output of the manufacturing sector is: 
),( MMMM LKFQ =  (2) 
where KM is capital in the manufacturing sector, and LM is labour.  Labour is the sole 
mobile factor across sectors.  The two other factors are fixed, and sector specific. 
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The Harris-Todaro version of the Model 
 In a traditional Harris-Todaro (1970) model the labour market equilibrium 
condition is written as: 
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where MW is the fixed urban wage and U  is unemployment. The left hand side of (3) 
represents the expected wage and the right hand side represents the agricultural wage 
(equal to the value marginal product of labor in agriculture).  This is the Harris-
Todaro equilibrium migration condition.  
Profit maximizing producers in the urban sector hire labour until the marginal 
product of labor in this sector equals the fixed urban wage, i.e. 
 
M
M
M L
FW ∂
∂=    . (4) 
Labour market clearing requires that 
 LULL AM =++  (5) 
where L  is the total availability of labor.   
Equations (3), (4) and (5) provide a system of three equations in three 
unknowns, LA, LM and U, given the supply of land in agriculture and capital in the 
urban sector; the well-known Harris-Todaro model.  The downward rigid real wage in 
the urban sector generates sector specific unemployment; government intervention to 
discourage migration is merited.   
Relative to the earlier Lewis (1954) model which was taken to support trade 
protection of the modern sector to draw surplus labour receiving its average not 
marginal product out of the traditional sector, surplus labour (unemployment) in the 
Harris Todaro model is in the urban not the rural sector.  Trade protection which 
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typically serves to promote the size of the manufacturing sector (if the country is a net 
importer of manufactures) will increase unemployment and compound traditional 
welfare costs of protection.  Harris and Todaro also discussed restrictions on internal 
migration within countries as a welfare improving policy in such circumstances. 
 
The Equivalent Pollution Model  
Given the Harris-Todaro structure, we can also formulate a closely related 
model of urban rural migration in which environmental damage is sector (location) 
specific, and its costs to workers enter the migration decision for labour.  In such a 
model, sector specific environmental damage operates similarly to unemployment in 
deterring migration to the urban sector.   
For simplicity, suppose that there is pollution only in the urban sector and the 
damage from pollution is denominated in units of labour.  Pollution can thus be 
thought of as reducing the efficiency of labour employed in the urban sector through 
congestion, poor air quality, higher incidence of disease and other externality effects.  
The costs of such damage are borne fully by urban workers.  Urban firms pay a wage 
equal to the marginal product of labour but the effective wage (in money metric 
terms) received by workers is the wage net of the average damage inflicted.   
We consider an equilibrium in which the per worker cost of pollution (or 
damage) in the urban sector is exactly equal to the expected costs of unemployment in 
the Harris-Todaro model.  The differential between urban and rural wage rates will 
now equal average damage per urban worker.  As differing amounts of damage will 
be associated with differing levels of migration we also need to remove the fixed 
urban wage which we now allow to vary.   
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Thus, instead of equation (5) we will now have a market clearing condition in 
the labour market 
 LDLL AM =++   (5’) 
where D is urban environmental damage denominated in units of labour. From the 
production side the urban wage again equals the marginal product of labor, and we 
have  
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However, in this case, the new labor market equilibrium condition is 
 
A
A
M
M
M L
Fp
DL
LW ∂
∂=



+  (3’) 
(3’), (4’) and (5’) again provide equilibrium conditions for the three unknowns:  LA, 
LM and WM.   
In this formulation, D can be chosen in such a way that its labour equivalent 
exactly equals unemployment, and the value of WM in this model is exactly equal to 
the fixed urban wage MW  in the earlier Harris-Todaro model. The two models are 
thus equivalent in generating the same equilibrium outcome.  Environmental damage 
displaces unemployment, or alternatively unemployment in Harris-Todaro models can 
be reinterpreted as damage.2 
 
III. Optimal Policy in the Equivalent Damage Model 
The equilibrium solution for the pollution equivalent model is, however, not 
production efficient in the Pareto sense since there is now an externality that can be 
internalized.  To see this, we can characterize Pareto efficiency and the associated 
                                                 
2 Other recent literature has focused on tax issues rather then environmental issues in the context of 
rural-urban migration in the Harris-Todaro model; see Gupta (1993), Partridge and Rickman (1997), 
Bhatia (2002) and Chau and Khan (2001). 
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Pigouvian tax needed to support an efficient allocation as a market outcome.  For 
analytical tractability we consider the exponential damage function D= LMλ.3   
Thus, a Pareto efficient allocation can be characterized as a solution to the 
optimisation problem:  
      max XM  
 subject to: AA XX ≥  and  LLLL AMM =++ λ . 
If we consider the Lagrangean: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]LLLLXLTFLKFL AMMAAAAMMM −+++−+= −121 1,, λµµ  (6) 
where µ1 and µ2 are Lagrange multipliers, first order conditions yield: 
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where  
 21 )1()1( −− −++= λλ λ MMM LLLZ  
Combining (7a) and (7b) yields the efficiency condition 
 ( )111 )1()1( −− −++∂∂=∂∂ λλ λµ MMAAMM LLLFLF  (8) 
This condition has a simple interpretation. When a worker leaves the agricultural 
sector for the manufacturing sector there is a drop in agricultural output, measured by 
the marginal product of labor in the agricultural sector but there is also a loss due to 
added congestion in the urban sector (the term Z).  At the optimum the marginal 
product of labor in the manufacturing sector must compensate for these two losses 
                                                 
3 See the use of this same damage function in Abrego and Whalley (2001). 
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evaluated at the shadow price of a unit of agricultural output 1µ . This, then, 
characterizes efficient production in this economy.  
It is easy to see that the efficiency condition (8) will not be generated by a 
perfectly competitive price mechanism. The marginal rate of transformation between 
the two goods will, in a competitive equilibrium, be equated to the relative price ratio 
p.   This does not satisfy (8).  
From (3’) we obtain 
 )1( 1−+=∂
∂
∂
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whereas for Pareto efficiency (from (8)) this marginal rate of transformation should be 
 ( )111 )1()1( −− −++=∂∂∂∂ λλ λµ MMAAMM LLFLLF  (10) 
An optimal Pigouvian tax reflects the difference between the MRT under 
Pareto efficiency and the MRT without a tax.  In other words we want to set  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }1111 1111 −−− −++=++ λλλ λµ MMM LLLtp  (11) 
where t is the rate for the Pigouvian tax.  From (11) we can solve for t as: 
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If p=1µ , this corresponds to a case where no distortions exist in output markets, and 
domestic prices equal world prices.  In this case, with utility maximizing behaviour by 
households, ( )
)1(
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Lt which yields an optimal tax rate given as the ratio of 
marginal to average damage. 
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If, however, there are distortions in output markets so that p≠1µ , then the 
optimal (second best) Pigouvian tax will need to be correspondingly modified.  In the 
special case where  
 11
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then the optimal tax rate t = 0.  This is a case where output market distortions and 
distortions of migration decisions via urban environmental damage offset each other. 
Generally, however, some optimal Pigouvian tax on the use of labour in the 
urban sector will be called for, and gains relative to a competitive migration 
equilibrium with an uninternalized externality can be achieved.  In this sense then, 
urban specific pollution (damage) when introduced into a no pollution Harris-Todaro 
model can be beneficial in providing welfare gains relative to a no pollution Harris-
Todaro equilibrium with unemployment.  Urban damage displaces urban 
unemployment, and then yields an externality that can be internalised. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
This short paper suggests that the generally held view that urban pollution 
(congestion, health effects) is bad is subject to analytical challenge.  In a Harris-
Todaro model of urban-rural migration, if unemployment is thought of as damage 
then urban specific environmental damage has similar effects on migration, and a 
form of model equivalence can be shown between with and without pollution variants 
of related models.  If an explicit damage function is then considered, internalization 
gains beyond this equilibrium are possible and hence introducing pollution (damage) 
into a Harris-Todaro model can lead to welfare improvements in this sense. 
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This is not to say that urban pollution in Asia and elsewhere is necessarily 
good, merely to make the point that it can offset bad effects elsewhere 
(unemployment).  In particular cases it can be viewed as welfare improving when 
introduced into a no pollution model with unemployment in urban areas since it first 
displaces unemployment, then creates an externality that can be internalized. 
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